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How do mental health professionals link adverse life experiences with the kinds of 
beliefs and experiences which attract a diagnosis of psychosis and what implications 
does this have for women with these diagnoses?  Drawing on a broadly critical 
realist framework, we present data from two studies relevant to these questions.  
First, we analyse the discursive practices engaged in during a staff-only discussion 
of a female in-patient with a psychosis diagnosis who had been raped some years 
previously.  Staff oriented to the irrationality and factuality of her ostensibly 
delusional statements about rape and pregnancy in the present and formulated 
adverse experience as a ‘stress factor’ triggering a manic episode, thereby 
precluding alternative contextualising interpretations.  In a second, interview-based, 
study, psychiatrists drew on a range of discursive resources which differentiated 
psychosis from other forms of distress, constructed trauma as a stressor which could 
trigger psychosis because of a genetic predisposition, and constructed medication as 
the primary intervention whilst a focus on trauma was de-emphasised.   We discuss 
the implications of these findings for the kinds of explanations and forms of help 
offered and suggest ways in which distress might be contextualised as well as 
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A ‘trigger’, a cause or obscured?: 
How trauma and adversity are constructed in psychiatric ‘stress-vulnerability’ 
accounts of psychosis 
 
 
Feminists researching psychiatric diagnosis have long sought to make sense of 
women’s psychological suffering by placing it in a political context, viewing it as a 
response to, often adverse, life circumstances but subject to medicalising discourse 
which obscures its social context (Lafrance, 2009; Warner, 2009).  Just over a third 
of those with psychosisi diagnoses are women (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2018) 
and they are particularly likely to experience both certain adversities and the 
medicalisation of their distress.  Compared with men, women with psychosis 
diagnoses report higher rates of sexual and physical victimisation in childhood and 
adulthood (Read, Agar, Argyle & Aderhold, 2003); causal links have been identified 
between psychiatric constructs like hallucinations and delusions and childhood 
abuse and neglect (Read et al., 2003), as well as a range of adversities in adulthood, 
including sexual victimisation (Elklit & Shevlin, 2011).  Yet DSM-5 links gender-
specific constructs like ‘post-partum psychosis’ (also referred to as ‘puerperal 
psychosis’) with women’s ‘reproductive life cycle’ and ‘oestrogen variations’ 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.15).  Such reductive biological accounts 
locate the causes of distress in the female body and ignore the social context of 
distress and the varied meaning which childbirth might have for women (Nicolson, 
2006).  For those women who have been sexually abused, for example, aspects of 
childbirth and perinatal care can be experienced as a ‘re-enactment’ of past abuse 
(Montgomery, Pope & Rogers, 2015). 
 
In this article, we examine how adversity is constructed in psychiatric discourse 
about psychosis in a staff discussion of the ostensibly delusional beliefs of a female 
in-patient and in interviews with psychiatrists about the aetiological role of trauma.  
Our analysis is informed by critical scholarship firstly, on aetiology and treatment 
and, secondly, on the content of the unusual beliefs and experiences seen as 
‘symptoms’ of psychosis.  We briefly review work on these topics before discussing 
our research questions and methodological approach. 
 
 
Assimilating adversity and prioritising medication  
 
It is possible to theorise the impact of adversity on biological systems and the 
development of the kind of beliefs and experiences which attract psychosis 
diagnoses without recourse to biologically reductive theories of schizophrenia (Read, 
Fosse, Moskowitz & Perry, 2014).  However, Mary Boyle (2013) has argued that it is 
much more common for psychiatric researchers to assimilate findings on adversity 
into their models in a manner that avoids or counters such interpretations.  For 
example, childhood adversity can simply be included as one of a number of ‘risk 
factors’ within a discourse of epidemiological medicine.  In a section headed 
‘neurobiologic and genetic factors’, a recent overview of schizophrenia in the New 




…obstetrical complications, early-life adversity, and childhood residence in 
urban areas, putatively interact with genetic risks to influence liability to 
schizophrenia. 
 
(Marder and Cannon, 2019, p.1753) 
 
 
That these factors are stated to ‘putatively interact with genetic risks’ signals the 
influence of a somatogenic assumptive framework, despite the fact that this 
interaction remains unproven (Cromby, Chung, Papadopoulos & Talbot, 2019).  
Such views are not unusual: a study of articles published in the American Journal of 
Psychiatry between 2005-2007 found that 95.4% attributed psychosis predominantly 
to biological factors whereas the proportion was 75% for both the British Journal of 
Psychiatry and the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry (Jarvis, Bhat, Jurcik, Spigonardo 
& Whitley, 2015). 
 
Zubin and Spring’s (1977) ‘stress-vulnerability’ account of psychosis is a variant of 
the biopsychosocial approach currently popular in mainstream practice. It 
hypothesises that psychosis arises as a result of the way in which people 
differentially respond to life stresses as a result of ‘inborn’ or ‘acquired’ 
vulnerabilities.  It frames potential adversities as stressors.  However, Johnstone and 
Boyle (2018, p.6) argued that these models ‘position social and relational factors as 
secondary to underlying biological causal malfunctions, and thus do not fully theorise 
distress as a meaningful, functional and understandable response to life 
circumstances’.  The models achieve this effect, according to Boyle (2013, p.16) ‘by 
“reducing” these life experiences either to consequences rather than causes or to 
triggers of biological predisposition, which act as the primary cause’ (Boyle, 2013, 
p.16, emphasis in original).  The trigger metaphor is common in psychiatric research 
including studies of ‘puerperal psychosis’ (e.g. Jones & Craddock, 2001). 
 
Somatogenic accounts warrant the primacy of drug treatment.  Thus, Blake, Collins 
and Seeman (2015, p.10) state that ‘[a]ntipsychotic medications are considered to be 
the foundation of treatment for psychosis’ and, indeed, 97.6% of British people with 
psychosis diagnoses are prescribed such medication (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
2018).  Within mainstream psychiatry, non-medical interventions play only an adjunct 
role.  Marder and Cannon (2019) devote much of their review to medication, whilst 
Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT) is mentioned in a section headed ‘management 
of a poor or partial response’ to medication.  Other psychosocial interventions are 
only briefly mentioned in relation to ‘improving functioning’ and they are said to be 
most effective only for those ‘whose condition has first been stabilized with an 
antipsychotic medication’ (2019, p.1758). 
 
As Moncrieff (2013) shows, this focus on medication is justified by somatogenic 
theories like the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia although these are heavily 
contested.  Moreover, she notes that these drugs have significant adverse effects on 
physical health, are of variable efficacy, and may be given compulsorily under mental 
health laws.  Kilty’s (2012) Canadian study demonstrates that women with psychosis 
diagnoses are not only overwhelmingly prescribed medication, they are also given 
little access to non-medical forms of help (Kilty, 2012).  This means that women with 
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psychosis diagnoses may be denied opportunities to develop alternative 
conceptualisations of their distress, and this brings us to a second key issue – the 




The meaning in madness and the decontextualizing effects of medicalising language 
 
Johnstone and Boyle (2018, p.28) argue that medicalisation locates problems 
primarily in people’s brains and bodies; this can ‘obscure the well-evidenced causal 
role of social and interpersonal factors in distress and make it much more difficult to 
understand people’s problems in the context of their lives and relationships’.  Dana 
Becker’s work on stress and trauma is a good example of this.  Becker (2013) 
argues that these constructs focus attention on psychological and physiological 
factors within the individual and how they react to stressors and deflect attention 
from changing the social conditions which cause stress.  The constructs of ‘stress’ 
and ‘trauma’ achieve these effects in a number of ways.  For example, the external 
cause and its psychological consequence are often fused: ‘trauma’ is used to refer 
both to the traumatising event and its emotional effect.  Moreover, both terms are 
reductive and euphemistic, and Becker questions whether complex and 
overwhelming feelings can be adequately conveyed by this vocabulary. 
 
Clinicians are dissuaded from exploring meaning since ‘it is not considered helpful or 
productive to deal with the content of patients' symptoms’ (McCabe et al., 2002, 
p.1150).  However, there is now an extensive body of work linking the content and 
phenomenology of voice-hearing to the social conditions of women’s lives.  
McCarthy-Jones et al (2015, p.13) conclude that there is a relationship between 
‘women voice-hearers and trauma, abuse, oppression, and marginalization’.  
Researchers have given less attention to the meaning of ostensibly delusional 
beliefs which, in mainstream psychiatry, are regarded as inherently un-
understandable.  However, Barrett (1996, p.64) has noted that there is often a 
“’kernel’ of truth contained within a delusion’ where elements of supposedly 
delusional claims turn out to be warranted whilst, in a study of psychiatric case 
notes, Read et al. (2003) found a striking similarity between the thematic content of 
supposedly delusional statements and documented abuse.  These researchers 
suggested a number of possible explanations for this link, for example, that 
delusions might be attempts to make sense of ‘abuse flashbacks by explaining them, 
in distorted fashion, in relation to the present rather than the past’ (p.16) 
 
Much of the critical work on which we have drawn has interrogated the published 
psychiatric literature, but talk is occasioned and shaped by its social context and is 
often less uniform than written texts (Georgaca, 2013).  In this article, therefore, we 
examine micro-level discourse, presenting data from two unpublished studies 
conducted by trainee clinical psychologists.  In the first study we analyse a staff 
discussion, during a multi-disciplinary team (MDT) ward round, of a female in-patient 
who had been raped some years previously and who was reported to hold delusional 
beliefs in which the thematic content concerned sexual violence and pregnancy.  We 
identify the discursive practices engaged in by staff (i.e. the ways in which talk was 
organised to achieve interpersonal, institutional and other goals).  But the meaning of 
distress may be obscured by the way in which mental health professionals talk about 
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it.  In her conversation analytic study of in-patient treatment planning meetings, 
Goicoechea (2013) described how diagnostic discourse enabled staff to ‘avoid the 
task of formulating connections between the individual and the social’ (p.116).  In 
one of the few studies to analyse how psychiatrists responded to ostensibly 
delusional beliefs in assessment interviews, the least frequent responses included 
tracing the history of the beliefs and exploring links with previous stressful 
experiences -- the kind of discussions which might have placed these beliefs in a 
social context (Zangrilli et al., 2014).  However, Goicoechea’s (2013) study did not 
include any extracts about apparently delusional beliefs whilst Zangrilli et al (2014) 
studied psychiatric assessment interviews rather than multi-disciplinary discussions.  
The research question we address in our first study is: How do staff in a MDT ward 
round discuss a woman’s ostensibly delusional beliefs in the context of past 
adversity? 
 
Our brief review suggests that a range of discursive resources is potentially available 
to mental health professionals when discussing trauma and psychosis.  Discursive 
resources are the culturally available discourses people draw upon when giving 
accounts which construct particular kinds of objects (i.e. phenomena) and forms of 
subjectivity (i.e. ways-of being in the world).  However, Isobel et al (2020) reported 
that, whilst their psychiatrist interviewees saw psychological trauma as relevant to 
some adult mental health problems, they viewed it as highly controversial in relation 
to psychosis.  Only a short section of that article specifically examined psychosis so, 
we present extracts from another study relevant to our second research question, 
which is: what discursive resources do psychiatrists draw on in interviews about the 
role of trauma in the aetiology of psychosis? 
 
We view these studies as complementary because interviews can help identify what 
discursive resources are available to professionals, whilst naturalistic talk can tell us 
how the everyday business of psychiatric work is actually conducted. 
 
 
Methodological rationale  
 
We draw on a different analytic tradition in each studyii but there is much debate in 
the field about whether such a dual focus may lead to theoretical and 
epistemological contradictions because of the different methodological heritages of 
Discursive Psychology (DP) and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA; Parker, 
1997; Willig, 2013; Wetherell, 1998).  Although there are cogent arguments for 
adopting an integrated analytic approach throughout (Lafrance, 2009; Wetherell, 
1998), there are criticisms (e.g. Speer, 2007) and limitations of space preclude the 
detailed discussion of ontological and epistemological assumptions that this would 
necessitate.  As a result, we present the two studies seriatim so that readers can 
bear in mind the differing theoretical assumptions brought to bear in each analysis.   
 
Our underlying methodological strategy is informed by critical realismiii which 
involves three key elements (Pilgrim, 2020).  Firstly, it is ontologically realist in that it 
assumes there is a potentially knowable independently-existing world in which 
causal influences are at work. We assume, for example, that human beings can 
harm each other and can experience distress though the historical and cultural 
 6 
context will shape constructions of what is considered harmful and how distress is 
experienced. 
 
Secondly, it is epistemologically relativist in that it assumes that the knowledge we 
gain of the world through our sensory capacities as social beings is partial and 
subject to revision and change (Chamberlain, 2015).  From this perspective, and 
consistent with some pragmatist philosophical traditions (Chamberlain, 2015), all 
research methods are imperfect.  Because of their different assumptions, every 
method simultaneously illuminates, but also obscures, some aspects of phenomena.  
Thus DP can inform us about how professionals actually talk about delusions in a 
particular case whilst FDA can inform us about the explanations available to 
professionals when they construct aetiological accounts of psychosis.  At the same 
time, DP can place too much emphasis on the occasioned aspects of discourse 
identified via interactional turns, thus obscuring the context outside of the interaction.  
Similarly, FDA can reify discourse, endow it with too much agency and thus obscure 
how it is occasioned in particular interactions. 
 
As Chamberlain (2015) notes, however, this epistemological relativism does not 
mean that our knowledge is arbitrary and this brings us to the third element of critical 
realism, the notion of judgemental rationality (Pilgrim, 2020).  This assumes that we 
can evaluate different knowledge claims in a reasoned manner.  This provides a 
basis not only for evaluating claims in a particular study but also for integrating 




Study I:  How staff members discuss a woman’s ostensibly delusional beliefs 
in the context of past adversity 
 
This study (see Platts, 2006) focuses on discursive practice and draws on the 
tradition of Discursive Psychology which attends to:  the action orientation of talk; the 
way in which talk is situated (sequentially, historically and rhetorically); and the way 
in which talk is both constructed and constructive (Wiggins, 2017).  The extract is 
from one of the MDT staff-only ward round discussions, which occurred before or 
after service users and relatives joined the meeting.  It was selected as it included a 
discussion of ostensibly delusional content and gender-specific aetiological factors.  
The study received ethical approval from both the University research ethics 
committee and an NHS ethics committee.  Staff gave prior consent to the recording 
of the ward rounds and identified potential in-patients.  Individuals were excluded 
from the study if it was considered that audio-recording might be harmful or where 
they were unable to provide valid consent. Consent was generally sought from in-
patients and from carers before the ward round but, where this was not possible (e.g. 
if they had been on leave), provisional consent was obtained during the ward round 
and then revisited afterwards.  The discussion was not recorded if anyone had 








Recruitment took place on a mixed-gender psychiatric ward and the third author 
spent over five weeks on the ward introducing himself to all potential participants (i.e. 
service users and professionals) and presenting information about the study via 
individual and group meetings (e.g. at the ward Community Meeting).  Five 
consecutive weekly ward rounds were recorded and transcribed involving the teams 
of two different psychiatrists.  All participants are referred to by pseudonyms.  In 
order to minimise the chances of identifying participants, their ages are reported in 
ranges.   
 
The ward round discussed the case of Jennifer, a woman aged 30-39.  Staff 
members present in the extract below include: Dr Arteta (a male Consultant 
Psychiatrist aged between 30-39), Dr Bashar (a female Senior House Officer aged 
between 20-29), Mariama (a female Staff Nurse aged between 30-39), Iris (a female 
Community Psychiatric Nurse [CPN] who was also Jennifer’s Care Co-ordinator, 
aged between 50-59), and an undergraduate medical student (female, aged between 
20-29).  Also present at the meeting but who did not speak during the extract 
presented here were Ralph (a male Social Worker aged between 30-39) and Brian 






There was insufficient time to transcribe all ward rounds using full Jeffersonian 
transcription conventions as the study was conducted within the limited timeframe of 
a professional training and so a simpler form of transcription was utilised.  For 
example, it was decided in advance not to focus on the contribution of pauses, 





(.)   A pause < 1 second 
((pause))  A pause of 1-3 seconds 
/   A speaker interrupts another speaker 
(hormonal)  Inaudible material or doubts about its accuracy 
[   ]    People speaking at same time  






Jennifer had first come into contact with mental health services ten years previously 
as a result of a psychotic episode following the birth of her first child.  During this ten-
year period she disclosed that, some time before she became pregnant, she had 
been raped (there was no apparent connection between the rape and the 
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pregnancy).  At the time of the ward round she had a diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder, 
had been on the ward for over six weeks and was being treated compulsorily under a 
Section of the Mental Health Act.  She was discussed at four separate ward rounds 
and was prescribed psychiatric medication, but not reported to be receiving any non-
medical forms of support.   
 
The extract presented here occurred immediately after Jennifer had been 
interviewed during the ward round.  In previous ward rounds, nurses had reported 
that, whilst an in-patient, Jennifer would visit a workplace where she had previously 
done voluntary work where, according to nursing staff, she would talk ‘non-stop’ 
about ‘a lot of nonsense’ resulting in her workmates contacting Iris (the CPN).  The 
MDT had interpreted this as behaviour indicative of psychosis and that Jennifer was 
‘still high’ (i.e. experiencing a manic episode).  
 
 
Student:  when did she start having (.) the manic (episodes), does it start 305 
from when you’re young or 306 
(.) 307 
Dr Bashar: she, she was admitted as a (.) 308 
Iris: at first, the onset for her, it was after um, she had her first child 309 
((pause)) and there was another incident when (.) she was 310 
raped ((pause)) that is true what she’s saying, but the thing is 311 
now, is that she keeps on about, that the rape is happening 312 
now, the way she said it at work, when she turns up at this place 313 
is like, “I’ve been raped, I, I’m expecting a baby” 314 
  [laughter – Mariama?] ((pause)) and she’s been raped (.) gang 315 
raped, and all sorts, I mean she can tell you the (name), the 316 
tablets that they put in her drink.  How do you know?  “Well, I 317 
came back and the drink was (.) you know, in a different place 318 
where I put it” [Mariama laughs] 319 
Dr Arteta: hmm 320 
((pause))  321 
Iris: poor Jenny.  Anyway, thank you very much, [will you] forward 322 
me the (.) copy of the CPA, great thanks / 323 
Dr Arteta:         [thank you] 324 
Student: I mean, was she completely fine before, before she had the 325 
baby (.) before she was raped? 326 
((pause)) 327 
Dr Arteta: someti-, some er, you have (.) for example in, post-natal 328 
depression (or), post-natal psychotic episode or, post-natal (.) 329 
manic, manic episode sometimes, (hormonal) changes, or one of 330 
the main factors that, trigger this, episode.  Of course, any stress 331 
factor could trigger (.) this situation 332 
 
 
The extract begins with a request from a medical student (lines 305-306) for 
information on aetiology both specifically in relation to Jennifer and more generally in 
relation to similar cases.  As Barrett (1996) notes, education of junior staff is one of 
the institutional goals of MDT discussions.  Although there are a number of 
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analytically interesting aspects in the extract, here we will focus on how aetiology and 
the content of Jennifer’s belief claims are discussed. 
 
The description of ‘onset’ as occurring ‘after um, she had her first child’ (line 309) is 
followed by a report of ‘another incident when (.) she was raped’ (lines 310-311) 
which is accompanied by a validation of factuality: ‘that is true what she’s saying’ (line 
311).  This appears to orient to statements (i.e. belief claims of rape and pregnancy) 
Jennifer had made in the immediately prior interview.  The factual validation of two 
potentially aetiologically significant events makes their chronology relevant – rape is 
linked with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorderv -- but the description of the rape renders 
the chronology vague as it is not temporally located in relation to other events (it is 
‘another incident’: line 310), which de-emphasises its aetiological significance. 
 
After this, Iris says ‘but the thing is now’ (lines 311-312) which serves to warrant a 
move from a presentation of the chronology of events in Jennifer’s past to a 
description of her statements and behaviour in the present (lines 312-319).  This 
account could be interpreted as rhetorically organised to counter the relevance of 
aetiological discussions, by presenting Jennifer’s present statements and behaviour 
as bizarre, delusional and thus of more pressing concern.  Thus, at lines 312-313 Iris 
reports that Jennifer ‘keeps on about, that the rape is happening now’.  This 
description presents Jennifer’s statements as consistent with conventional psychiatric 
accounts of delusions:  ‘keeps on about’ orients to preoccupation whilst the lack of 
accompanying factual validation from either Iris or other participants orients to falsity.  
This is followed by a description of Jennifer visiting her previous workplace.  At lines 
313-314, Iris says ‘the way she said it at work, when she turns up at this place is like, 
“I’ve been raped, I, I’m expecting a baby”’.  The lack of context-setting information 
and use of discursive devices (Wiggins, 2017) like reported speech (i.e. where a 
speaker appears to provide a literal representation of something previously said) and 
extreme case formulation (i.e. where extreme examples are given to strengthen an 
argument) increase the vividness of this account and emphasise the incongruity of 
Jennifer’s conduct and her preoccupation with ostensibly false beliefs.  As Smith 
(1978, p.23) has noted, descriptions of ‘”mentally ill type” behaviour’ present it as 
anomalous, not making sense to others and ‘not properly provided for by relevant 
social rules or definitions of the situation’.   
 
Similar discursive devices are used in descriptions of Jennifer’s claims that she has 
been ‘gang raped’ (lines 315-316) and that tablets have been put in her drink (i.e. 
that her drink has been spiked; lines 316-317).  In a question and answer exchange, 
presented as reported speech (lines 317-319), Jennifer’s response is presented as 
unpersuasive and its bizarreness is emphasised by noting that ‘she can tell you the 
(name), the tablets that they put in her drink’.  That an account presented as 
delusional incorporates such specific detail increases its incongruity -- the laugh from 
Mariama, the staff nurse, suggests that this description can be interpreted as having 
been constructed as bizarre by other participants.  Barrett (1996) reports that staff-
only discussions of behaviour or speech judged to be bizarre were often 
accompanied by laughter and descriptions highlighting their apparent absurdity.  He 
also observes that such an exchange may be followed by a participant making a 




The medical student asks a further question at lines 325-326 including both the rape 
and birth as of potential aetiological relevance and asking whether Jennifer had been 
‘completely fine before’.  In Dr Arteta’s response, the term ‘post-natal’ is repeated 
three times (lines 328-329), referring to psychiatric diagnostic categories, but the 
rape is not mentioned.  The possible reference to hormonal changes (line 330) 
appears to orient to somatogenic explanatory accounts of these diagnoses.  Dr Arteta 
then states that ‘any stress factor could trigger this episode’ (lines 321-322).  This 
formulation could be seen as rhetorically organised to counter accounts that 
emphasise how different adverse life events might have different effects, and the 
phrase ‘any stress factor’ has two important effects.  Firstly, events preceding the 
episode are treated as equivalent.  Secondly, they are made relevant only in relation 
to the stress they cause.  The trigger metaphor could be seen as having a similar 
effect in that past events are relevant only to the extent to which they act as a trigger.  
Agency is thus placed elsewhere – in an ambiguous and latent entity or process, 
possibly the ‘episode’ -- and other potential formulations linking past events and 
Jennifer’s current statements and behaviour are de-emphasised. 
 
Two institutional goals appear to be relevant to the participants.  Firstly, participants 
are oriented to an educational goal (responding to a student’s questions).  Secondly, 
participants are oriented to presenting a description which is consistent with 
Jennifer’s psychiatric diagnosis:  her behaviour is explicable as a symptom of a 
manic episode (rather than other candidate diagnoses) and past events in her life are 
linked to the episode only as triggers. 
 
Alternative non-medical formulations of Jennifer’s troubles or psychiatric formulations 
which might place more emphasis on the rape, are ‘hearably not part of’ (Wetherell, 
1998, p.404) the discussion.  Their absence has the effect of precluding the 
possibility of other forms of help or understanding.  As noted earlier, medication 
(which was being given compulsorily) was the only intervention mentioned at the 
ward rounds where Jennifer was discussed though, of course, we do not know to 
what extent alternatives might have been discussed previously. 
 
We draw next from an interview-based study since such studies enable access to a 




Study II: Discursive resources drawn on by psychiatrists in talking about the 
role of trauma in the aetiology of psychosis   
 
This study (see O’Donnell, 2014) focuses on discursive resources and draws on the 
Foucauldian Discourse Analytic tradition.  Since the data are derived from interviews 
of psychiatrists by a psychologist, readers should bear in mind that this context might 
occasion certain kinds of justificatory responses.  The study received ethical approval 









Potential participants were recruited via informal professional networks.  They were 
informed that the study focused on whether the views held by psychiatric 
professionals about trauma and the aetiology of psychosis influenced their views 
about diagnosis, treatment and other aspects of care.  The second author 
interviewed psychiatrists who responded. Once again, demographic details will be 
presented at the group level and ages are reported in ranges.  Seven psychiatrists 
from NHS mental health services in London were interviewed. There were five 
women and two men, aged between 25-34 and 55-64 years old. Two participants 
were at a junior level, three were Consultant Psychiatrists and one was a recently 





Given the focus on discursive resources, extracts are transcribed orthographically 
with punctuation, and line numbers are given for the extracts as a whole rather than 
on each line.  Interviewees are referred to by initials. Brief interruptions by the 
interviewer are indicated by /.  Pauses are not noted.  Since the questions and 
responses were quite long and we wished to include a range of extracts, extracts are 
edited with omitted text indicated by ellipsis in square brackets:  […].  The 
interviewer’s question is not included but is summarized before each extract so 
readers can understand some of the interactional context.  Explanatory information is 





Trauma as stress 
 
When asked to define ‘trauma’, interviewees often drew on a discourse of stress: 
 
Dr G: […] trauma usually suggests something, severe stress /Interviewer: 
uhuh/ in a person’s life, um, this kind of trauma could be anything like sexual 
abuse, physical abuse, emotional abuse (165 -168). 
 
The objects constructed here include trauma, stress and categories of abuse.  The 
term ‘trauma’ appears to refer both to a traumatising event (‘trauma could be 
anything like sexual abuse …’) and its effects (‘trauma usually suggests something, 
severe stress’) as observed by Becker (2013).  Kinds of traumatising events are 
categorised by the mode of the abuse.  Stress is constructed here as something 
which can vary along a quantitative dimension.  As in the extract in Study 1, since the 
subjective impacts of traumatising events are only represented in terms of the 
amount of stress they cause, the complex range of feelings or meanings which might 
be associated with such events are thus obscured (Becker, 2013).  Moreover, the 







When asked about the aetiology of psychosis, interviewees commonly referred to 
those attracting psychosis diagnoses as being predisposed in some way, though 
there was some variation in the extent to which agency was located in exclusively 
biological processes. Dr B had described different types of psychosis presentation 
and was asked whether they drew on different aetiological models if trauma was 
involved. 
 
Dr B: […] so basically if I'm genetically programmed to develop schizophrenia 
in the case of exposure to certain degree of distress, then I will become 
schizophrenic (258 - 261) 
 
Dr B:  […] if I do not carry genes which predispose me to dopamine 
dysfunction in my brain, severe dopamine dysfunction, severe dopamine 
excess in my mesolimbic system then, I will be, even when exposed to severe 
stress during my childhood, I will probably be less likely to develop 
schizophrenia but I will be more likely to develop er er trauma related 
emotional er er instability, which will manifest in all sorts of behavioural 
outcomes of er behavioural symptoms of, of er borderline PD [personality 
disorder] (263 - 270) 
 
Dr B presents a biogenic account which constructs a variety of key objects.  A person 
can ‘carry genes’, which can ‘predispose’ to dysfunction and excess of the 
neurotransmitter dopamine (repeated three times).  One can then ‘develop 
schizophrenia' if ‘exposed to severe stress’.  This is contrasted with ‘borderline PD’ 
which is not associated with either genes or neurotransmitters.  Here, ‘severe stress’ 
is associated with ‘trauma related emotional … instability’ and ‘behavioural outcomes’ 
and ‘behavioural symptoms’.  This account appears to be rhetorically organised to 
counter an argument that the development of schizophrenia might be linked to the 
severity of stress – schizophrenia is less likely ‘even when exposed to severe stress’ 
if one does not carry genes predisposing to dopamine dysfunction.   
 
Although the link between genes and the development of schizophrenia is initially 
framed deterministically (‘I will be’), this is then qualified using more probabilistic 
terms (‘I will probably be less likely’).  This variation enables the account to counter a 
potential challenge to a more straightforwardly deterministic account; the dopamine 
hypothesis is heavily contested (Moncrieff, 2013) whilst epigenetic theories note how 
gene expression can be influenced by the environment (Cromby et al., 2019). 
 
The hypothetical ‘schizophrenic’ patient is said to be ‘genetically programmed’.  This 
metaphor locates agency in genes and neurotransmitters rather than the person.  
The context and personal meaning of adverse experiences are absent – as in the 
extract from Dr G, subjective experience is represented within a vocabulary of stress 
which is constructed as varying only in quantitative terms, thus precluding other, 






Trauma as a trigger but not a cause 
 
Dr E:  […] I wouldn’t think of a trauma as a cause of a psychotic illness 
/Interviewer: right yeah/ I would think of it as a trigger (722-723). 
 
The construction (‘a trauma’) appears to fuse a traumatising event with its effects in a 
similar manner to the extract from Dr G’s interview.  Here the nature of environmental 
influence is described via a contrast between a ‘cause’ and a ‘trigger’.  This 
formulation appears to be rhetorically organised to counter an argument that a 
traumatic event could cause ‘psychotic illness’ without any intervening process.  The 
trigger metaphor implies that a traumatic event only leads to psychosis because it 
has released a (not clearly specified) automatic mechanism.  These metaphors 
preclude more complex descriptions of agency, subjective experience and context. 
 
 
Trauma and treatment 
 
In discussions of aetiology, interviewees drew on formulations which contrasted 
psychosis diagnoses with non-psychosis diagnoses as seen in the extract from Dr 
B’s interview.  Interviewees drew on a similar contrast formulation in talk about 
treatment.  For example, following a discussion about schizophrenia and PTSD, Dr F 
was asked whether trauma played a different aetiological role in each. 
 
Dr F: No, I think the role trauma plays is probably similar, but the illness is 
what’s different /Interviewer: right/ so the diagnosis, treatment and outcome of 
schizophrenia would be quite different obviously to depression or P-, PTSD, so 
the different pathways, totally different emphasis on medication perhaps 
someone with depression after PTSD may not need medication at all 
/Interviewer: mmm mmm/ they’d just need maybe the right kind of 
psychological therapy. Whereas with schizophrenia you’re probably going to 
want to give them medication as a core part of the treatment /Interviewer: 
mmm mmm/ you know, not the only thing, but certainly it would be 
/Interviewer: yeah/ a large part of it.  (874-883). 
 
A key object constructed here is ‘the illness’ and it is the difference constructed 
between schizophrenia and ‘depression or P-, PTSD’ which warrants the ‘totally 
different emphasis on medication’ in the treatment of each.  Whilst depression or 
PTSD ‘may not need medication at all’ and maybe only require ‘the right kind of 
psychological therapy’, for schizophrenia, medication is ‘a large part of’ and ‘a core 
part of the treatment’.  Although other interventions are not excluded (medication may 
not be ‘the only thing’) they are constructed as secondary to medication.  The warrant 
for medication, then, is ‘the illness’ and the role of trauma and aetiology are thus de-
emphasised and seen as less relevant to the justification of medication as a 
treatment. 
 
This de-emphasising of the role of trauma in treatment was seen elsewhere in the 
interviews.  For example, Dr E was asked whether, if a person with a psychosis 
diagnosis disclosed having experienced trauma in the past, this would lead to a 
change in their diagnosis or treatment.   
 
 14 
Dr E: I think, I think there isn’t the time in the system that we work in. Not so 
much in our team, but in gen-, mainstream psychiatry /Interviewer: uhuh/ there 
is, isn’t the time, the resources et cetera to, which is very sad for me to say, to, 
to explore that and to undo the problems and /Interviewer: yeah/ so therefore 
it’s a repeating pattern that just gets reinforced and reinforced and then people 
/Interviewer: uhuh/ are in the system for twenty years and then you can’t do 
anything about it /Interviewer: mmm/, they are just institutionalized. (409-417). 
 
 
There are a number of interesting discursive features here but we will focus on 
discursive resources related to trauma and time.  Firstly, time and resources are 
constructed as insufficient and this sets up a positioning of resource allocation and 
prioritisation though this remains implicit and accountability for such allocations and 
agency are seen as lying elsewhere. The lack of focus on trauma in treatment is seen 
as part of the taken-for-granted nature of ‘the system’.  The statement ‘which is very 
sad for me to say’ constructs the lack of focus on trauma as regrettable.  However, Dr 
E does not say that, as a result, effective treatment is not possible.  Thus a focus on 
trauma could be said to be constructed as a desirable but not necessary requirement 
of treatment.  The object of trauma is constructed as something that could be 
explored and undone at an earlier stage but also as something that becomes less 
amenable to treatment over time.  Agency is not located in the hypothetical patient 
here but, rather, in repeating patterns, reinforcement and institutionalisation and the 
outcome (i.e. when ‘you can’t do anything about it’) is, again, constructed as 
inevitable.  This formulation shares features with narratives of chronicity (Harper, 
1999).  As a result, a focus on trauma in treatment is constructed as desirable but not 
necessary whilst a failure to focus on it is constructed as the regrettable but inevitable 
result of factors outside of the individual psychiatrist’s control.  These two explanatory 
accounts provide a justification for why trauma might not be a focus of treatment both 
at an earlier time (because of lack of time and resources) and at a later time 





Although a number of our findings confirm previous work, the contribution of the 
present article is to show how, in Boyle’s (2002, p.207) words, psychiatric discourse 
manages to make particular versions of reality ‘seem reasonable’.  Through a range 
of discursive practices and resources, somatogenic theories and treatments were 
subtly privileged with their contested status left unacknowledged, whilst other 
potential conceptualisations were de-emphasised.  Here we make connections 
between some of the key discursive features and processes we have identified and 
previous work and discuss their implications for future feminist research and practice.   
 
Constructing the aetiology of psychosis as inherently different from that of other 
forms of distress de-emphasised the role of adversity:  causal agency was located in 
a latent genetic predisposition, represented through the use of the trigger metaphor.  
As in Isobel et al’s (2020) study, our psychiatrist interviewees differentiated between 
the role of trauma in the aetiology of other problems and its role in psychosis.  
However, in contrast with their study, our interviewees did not regard the aetiological 
role of trauma as ‘contentious’ or ‘risky’.  Rather, adversity was framed as triggering 
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an unidentified but agentic entity or process.  This suggests that a crucial function of 
stress-vulnerability and genetic predisposition accounts of psychosis is to ‘ensure 
that social and psychological factors do not appear to be primary causes of mental 
distress and therefore primary targets for intervention’ (Boyle, 2013, p.14). The 
persistence of these causal explanations, still unproven despite much well-funded 
bio-genetic research (Cromby et al., 2019), merits further research. 
 
Biopsychosocial and multi-factorial accounts are highly flexible (Harper, 1999; 
Horton-Salway, 2002) and can thus enable ‘the sheer adaptability of the medical 
model and its power to shift our attention, to invalidate, assimilate and neutralise 
challenges’ (Boyle, 2013, p.20).  As a result, it is important to remain vigilant about 
the way in which findings on the impact of adversity can be assimilated into 
biologically reductionist models through a focus on brain development (Wastell & 
White, 2017).  Trauma discourse, as Becker (2013) has noted, affords only a 
restricted range of subject positions for service users and, as it becomes increasingly 
prominent, researchers could attend to how it is used and the ways in which it may 
be recruited into biomedical narratives. 
 
Constructing psychosis as inherently different from other forms of distress enables 
the content of unusual beliefs and experiences to be viewed simply as a 
manifestation of an illness rather than being intelligible in the context of past 
adversity.  The categorical difference constructed between psychosis and normal 
experience can be countered by showing how the apparently ‘abnormal’ responses 
of clinical populations lie on a continuum of responses within the general population, 
drawing on studies identifying the varied ways in which the non-clinical population 
respond to adversities (Boyle, 2013).  Feminist work can render distress intelligible by 
drawing on a range of alternative conceptual frameworks to place it in its social 
context. 
 
Although not explicitly feminist, an increasingly influential contextualising perspective 
is the ‘trauma-informed’ approach which assumes that many, though not all, 
psychiatric service users may have experienced adversities including traumatising 
experiences (Sweeney & Taggart, 2018).  As psychiatric survivor Jacqui Dillon puts 
it, ‘instead of asking people – what is wrong with you?  We ask people – what has 
happened to you?’ (Dillon, 2011, p.155). Within the Hearing Voices Movement, many 
members report that their unusual experiences and beliefs are intelligible in the 
context of abuse in childhood and adulthood (Corstens, Longden, McCarthy-Jones, 
Waddingham & Thomas, 2014) as demonstrated in a collection of fifty first-person 
accounts (Romme et al., 2009).  A related approach is to reconceptualise psychiatric 
‘symptoms’ as coping strategies which women have utilised to survive traumatic 
experiences (Warner, 2009).  The Power Threat Meaning Framework (Johnstone & 
Boyle, 2018) suggests that people ask ‘What did you have to do to survive?’, 
proposing that human beings may respond to the threats posed by adversities in a 
range of ways, serving different functions. 
 
In Study 1, falsity and bizarreness were emphasised as the most relevant aspects of 
Jennifer’s beliefs and this enabled them to be seen as manifestations of a ‘manic 
episode’.  But the literal or ‘historical truth’ of statements is only one aspect of 
meaning – another is their ‘narrative truth’ (Spence, 1982).  Focusing only on the 
literal truth of Jennifer’s belief claims precludes the possibility that they may, when 
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understood using a more contextualised approach, be intelligible and meaningful in 
the context of her life history (Montgomery et al., 2015; Read et al., 2003).    
 
In the studies, medicalising discourse constructed psychosis as inherently different 
from other forms of distress, obscured the role of adversities and the social context 
and decontextualized potentially meaningful beliefs and experiences as “symptoms.”  
An outcome of this is, as Warner (2009, p.17) has argued, that ‘[t]reatment is then 
orientated away from women’s lives (e.g. exploration of what they do to cope) and 
back towards internalized disorder (e.g. pharmaceutical management of their 
“disease”)’.  Whilst, in our data, there was no frank dismissal of non-medical 
interventions focused on the legacy of adversity, they were ascribed a secondary 
role, as other researchers have found.  Isobel et al (2020, p.3) note: 
 
Mostly, awareness of trauma did not directly alter psychiatrists’ approach to 
treating mental illness. In acute settings, trauma treatment was considered 
secondary to stabilising symptoms and crisis resolution.  
 
A systematic review of international studies (Read, Harper, Tucker & Kennedy, 2018) 
found that even when adults disclosed childhood adversity, it was often not included 
in formulations or treatment plans and medication was the primary intervention.  Also, 
only a minority of people were referred for psychological therapies, something Kilty 
(2012) found in her sample of women with psychosis diagnoses in Canada.  There is 
a need for more critical scholarship which engages with the way in which medication 
is prioritised in a range of publications (e.g. Blake et al., 2015; Marder & Cannon, 
2019).  
 
Despite academic debate about the aetiology, diagnosis and treatment of psychosis, 
there was little acknowledgement of this in our data apart from some evidence of 
hedging, and the use of qualifications and disclaimers.  As a result, it would seem 
that service users with psychosis diagnoses are unlikely to be made aware of the 
contested status of psychiatric knowledge and practice, information which would 
likely influence their decision-making.  For example, in Billcliff, McCabe and Brown’s 
(2001) study of long-term psychiatric in-patients, the majority of whom had a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, 81% of their sample did not know any of the adverse 
effects of their medication and most thought they had no choice in whether to take 
them.  Researchers could evaluate interventions designed to provide service users 
with such information. 
 
The discursive resources drawn on by our participants in accounts of aetiology and 
treatment afforded those with psychosis diagnoses relatively little agency.  The 
potentially varied meanings of -- and responses to -- adverse experiences were 
absent.  The dominance of a biomedical frame of explanation and treatment 
precluded the possibility that those with psychosis diagnoses might wish to access a 
range of alternative explanatory frameworks and forms of help.  However, British 
psychologists have begun to more assertively denote the medical approach to 
psychosis as only one of a number of different approaches, arguing that service 
users should be enabled to make informed choices from a range of alternatives – 
including not only psychological therapies but also community and peer-led 
approaches (Cooke, 2017).  In her discussion of peer-led hearing voices groups, Gail 
Hornstein (2013) emphasises the importance they place on validating a range of 
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explanatory accounts and she also notes the way in which the groups engage in a 
collective exploration of the meaning of voices, practices which have a broader 
resonance with feminist practice. 
 
Our approach is open to a number of criticisms.  FDA researchers might criticise the 
analysis of Study 1 for an insufficient attention to influences outside the text whilst DP 
researchers might argue that we have not sufficiently attended to the occasioned 
aspects of talk in Study 2.  Both groups might also argue that the analysis in each 
study is not internally consistent.  Lastly, our approach could be criticised for a 
selective approach to epistemology or an unsystematic application of analytic 
methods across the two studies (Speer, 2007).  Our hope is that the analyses of the 
two studies have been consistent enough to be persuasive and that readers will 
agree that the problems involved in drawing on two methods are outweighed by the 
potential benefit of gaining a fuller understanding of psychiatric discourse and its 
effects. 
 
In conclusion, constructing the unusual beliefs and experiences of women with 
psychosis diagnoses as symptoms of an illness which requires medical treatment 
(i.e. medication), not only obscures the links between adversity and the suffering it 
causes, but it also limits the horizons of intervention.  As Becker (2013) has argued, 
stress and trauma discourses not only provide a limited vocabulary for describing 
adverse events with complex emotional responses but they also direct attention away 
from trying to change the social conditions which cause them.  Research on the 
impact of Adverse Childhood Events is increasingly influencing policymaking in 
education and health and social care (Wastell & White, 2017).  Although a focus on 
adversity is welcome, the danger is that policy may only be directed toward 
ameliorating and treating its effects once it has occurred.  We need, instead, to place 
much more emphasis on preventing such experiences from happening in the first 





This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Marcia Worrell who sadly died 
while it was being written.  Marcia had a longstanding research interest in how 
childhood adversity was discursively constructed, having focused her PhD on this 
topic.  Feminist psychology has lost an important voice, but her influence will live on 
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i The term ‘psychosis’ is increasingly used by mental health professionals to cover a broad range of 
diagnoses like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and other schizophrenia spectrum disorders though it 
fails to resolve their longstanding conceptual problems (Boyle, 2002, 2013). 
ii Readers are directed to O’Donnell (2014) and Platts (2006) for detailed information about the 
procedure and analytic steps in the two studies.   
iii This again is a topic of considerable debate and readers are referred to Chamberlain (2015) and 
Willig (2012) for an extended discussion of the compatibility between versions of social 
constructionism and critical realism. 
iv To avoid such a priori decisions Wiggins (2017) suggests transcribing only those extracts which are 
to be analysed. 
v ‘Post-partum’ onset is seen as a specifier for diagnoses of mania and depression in DSM-5 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.15) but there is no similar diagnostic specifier for psychosis 
following sexual violence.  DSM-5 mentions rape specifically only in the description of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. 
